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Summary 
The paper elaborates on the relationship between social citizenship and juridification. 
Departing from a Marshallian understanding of social citizenship, juridification 
processes concern the institutional construction of social citizenship by combining 
collective political obligations on the one hand and individual rights and duties on the 
other. One important intention of the paper is to elaborate on how social citizenship is 
constructed in the possible tension field between political, administrative and legal 
institutions. How does welfare law affect the relationship between welfare 
administration/professions and individuals (e.g. social and civil rights) and between law 
and politics (e.g. social and political rights)? 
The institutionalization of social citizenship has to be studied on the basis of 
different areas of welfare law. This is exemplified by two empirical cases: the legal 
development in the field of work and welfare on the one hand and health services on 
the other. In the field of health services it seems reasonable to say that a juridification 
process has taken place in Norway - implying a reinforcement of individual patients’ 
rights and thus a strengthening of social citizenship. The expansion of rights within the 
sector encompasses claims to certain services and through the legislation patients are 
granted procedural rights and an increased opportunity to decide on questions 
concerning medical examination and treatment. In the field of social policy individual 
legal rights to social benefits have increasingly been comprehended as to render people 
passive, leading to a stronger coupling between individual rights and duties expressed 
through the establishment of quasi-contractual legal arrangements. It may be argued that 
contractualism implies de-juridification in the way that it emphasizes tailor-made 
services and increased local discretion in the preparation of the content of welfare 
policies (weak legal control). 
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Sammendrag 
Dette paperet retter søkelyset mot forholdet mellom rettsliggjøring og sosialt 
medborgerskap. Med utgangspunkt i et Marshalliansk perspektiv kan 
rettsliggjøringsprosesser sies å berøre den institusjonelle konstruksjonen av sosialt 
medborgerskap gjennom å kombinere kollektive politiske forpliktelser på den ene siden 
og individuelle rettigheter og plikter på den andre. Et viktig mål med dette arbeidet er å 
undersøke hvordan sosialt medborgerskap konstrueres i spenningsfeltet mellom 
politiske, administrative og rettslige institusjoner. Hvordan påvirker velferdsretten 
relasjonen mellom velferdsadministrasjon/profesjon og den enkelte borger og mellom 
rett og politikk? 
Institusjonaliseringen av sosialt medborgerskap må studeres med utgangspunkt i 
konkrete deler av velferdsretten. I paperet er dette eksemplifisert gjennom to empiriske 
case: rettsutviklingen på områdene helse og arbeid/velferd. På helseområdet er det 
rimelig å si at det har foregått en rettsliggjøringsprosess i Norge hvor individuelle 
pasientrettigheter har stått sentralt. Utviklingen omfatter både en utvidet rett til 
bestemte tjenester, nye prosedurale rettigheter og en større rett til å velge når det gjelder 
beslutninger som angår medisinske undersøkelser og behandling. På området 
velferd/arbeid har retten til velferdsytelser i større grad blitt sett på som passiviserende i 
forhold til den enkeltes deltakelse i arbeidsmarkedet. Dette har resultert i en sterkere 
kopling mellom individuelle rettigheter og plikter blant annet uttrykt gjennom en økt 
bruk av kvasi-kontraktuelle arrangementer i iverksettingen av velferdspolitikken. Det 
kan argumenters for at en slik kontraktualisme innebærer en materiell avrettsliggjøring i 
den forstand at den innebærer økt individualisering (skreddersøm) og større rom for 
lokal skjønnsutøving i utformingen av velferdstjenester (svakere rettslig kontroll). 
  5 
Preface 
The paper is written as a part of the research project «Judicialisation1 and Social 
Citizenship», funded by the Norwegian Research Council (the Welfare, Work and 
Migration programme (Vam)). It was presented at the conference «Challenging 
Citizenship», Coimbra Portugal, 3–5 June 2011 
                                                 
1 In this paper we have chosen to use the more general concept «juridification» instead of «judicialisation».  
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Introduction 
After the presentation of the Norwegian Power Report («Power and Democracy») in 
2003 (NOU 2003:19) there has been a broad debate among social scientists (legal 
scientists, sociologists, political scientists etc.) about different kinds of juridification 
processes in Norway and their possible consequences. The concept of «juridification» is 
not a simple one and has been interpreted in various ways. Generally, however, 
juridification processes may be understood as more detailed legal regulation, legal 
regulations of new areas, conflicts and problems increasingly being framed as legal 
claims and a development where a judicial way of thinking and acting penetrates new 
social fields (Blichner & Molander 2008). 
This paper elaborates on the relationship between social citizenship and 
juridification. Departing from a Marshallian understanding of social citizenship, which is 
closely attached to ideas of social rights, juridification processes concerns the 
institutional construction of social citizenship by relating collective political obligations 
and individual rights and duties.  
One important intention of the paper is to elaborate on how social citizenship is 
constructed in the possible tension field between political, administrative and legal 
institutions. Our main empirical spotlight is turned on welfare law. Social rights are, 
however, also discussed in relation to other rights such as political and civil rights. How 
does welfare law affect the relationship between welfare administration/professions and 
individuals (e.g. social and civil rights) and between law and politics (e.g. social and 
political rights)? Our goal is confined to pinpoint some possible problems for further 
empirical and theoretical investigation. The institutionalization of social citizenship has 
to be studied on the basis of different areas of welfare law. This is exemplified by two 
empirical cases: the legal development in the field of work and welfare on the one hand 
and health services on the other. 
Social Citizenship 
The modern concept of citizenship (citoyen2) originates from the autonomous 
European city-states and is constituted on the basis of those kinds of rights that could 
be deduced from a person’s status as a member of a city (Kalberg 1993). While in the 
city-state only specific groups were carriers of citizen rights, citizenship in modern 
nation states has a more universal scope. Citizen rights are founded on a general status 
of belonging, i.e. on membership in a particular political community. The status of 
citizenship is compounded by what has been described as different catalogs of rights 
(Cohen & Arato 1992). On the theoretical level the most well known differentiation 
between such catalogs is T H Marshall’s concepts of civil, political and social rights. 
                                                 
2 As different from, for instance the German (and similar Dutch) Bürgertum (bourgeoisie) that was a special status 
group attempting to develop a new type of personality regulated by the discipline of education (members of the 
bourgeoisie class and bourgeois society) (Turner 1993:10). 
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According to Marshall Civil rights are closely related to the development of the Rechstaat 
and are oriented towards a differentiation between the state on the one hand and civil 
society and the market on the other. Property rights, freedom of contracts, freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly, equality before the law (and due process of law) are 
important aspects of civil rights. The civil elements is composed of the rights necessary 
for individual freedom and the institutions most directly associated with these rights are 
the courts of justice (Marshall 1950/2000:32). Political rights concern the democratic 
mediation between citizens and the state, highlighting the values of collective self-
determination. By the political element Marshall means «the right to participate in the 
exercise of political power as a member of a body invested with political authority or as 
an elector of the members of such a body» (op.cit:32). The most important institutions 
are parliaments and councils of local government. 
Analyses of social citizenship will, of course, focus most specifically on the third 
catalog of rights – social rights. The main idea behind these kinds of rights is that citizens 
have to be assured a basic material subsistence in order to be able to follow their own 
life-projects and have the opportunity to participate in community life and in the work 
of mutual concerns (Nilssen 1997). In order to function as free, equal and autonomous 
members of the society within political, economic and social structures citizens need to 
have rights to fundamental resources that make them capable of taking well informed 
and conscious choices (Rothstein 1994). 
In Marshall’s theory there is a strong relationship between social citizenship and 
autonomy (Kildal & Nilssen 2011). Marshall (1950/2000) considers the citizens’ capacity 
to act autonomously as the essence of social citizenship. Freedom has to be positively 
secured if everybody should have a fair chance to exercise it. This cannot be fulfilled 
solely by distributing resources through the institutions of civil society or the market. 
Governmental redistribution of resources is considered as an important means in 
enabling people to participate in society and making use of their citizen rights 
(Johansson 1992). By the social element Marshall means: 
«..the whole range, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security 
to the right to share the full the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized 
being according to the standards prevailing in the society» (Marshall 
1950/2000:32) 
The most important institutions mentioned by Marshall are the educational system and 
the social services. Hence, by guaranteeing the material well-being of the citizens 
through social rights rather than arbitrary benevolence, the welfare state aims to protect 
citizens against social risks that reduce their ability to act as independent persons (Kildal 
& Nilssen 2011). As distinct from traditional charity and discretional policies on 
poverty, social rights are regarded as individual rights anchored in the status of 
citizenship. 
From a legal point of view the concept of rights is closely connected with positive 
law. In order to speak about a right in a legal sense two conditions have to be satisfied 
(Handler 2004:248). 1) Eligibility has to be fairly clear-cut, with a minimum of field-level 
discretion and 2) the benefit have to be infinitely divisible. The concept of rights may, 
on the other hand, be given a weaker legal foundation. It may only express a political 
obligation to put some kind of resources at the citizens’ disposal (for instance health 
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services) without citizens having any legal claim on such resources. This means that 
different welfare professions may exercise a certain scope of discretion in the 
implementation of social rights. Marshall’s conception of social rights was primarily 
oriented towards the legal approach although he gradually appreciated that a strong legal 
interpretation of rights was not very realistic in every part of the welfare state (Marshall 
1965; Marshall & Bottomore 1992). This is particularly valid for benefits in the form of 
a service. Such benefits have this characteristic: 
«… that the right of the citizen cannot be precisely defined. The qualitative 
element is too great. A modicum of legally enforceable rights may be granted, but 
what matters to the citizen is the superstructure of legitimate expectations» 
(Marshall & Bottomore 1992:34) 
Handler (2004) points out that citizenship commonly refers to a legal/political status 
within a nation state which has certain entitlements such as the right to hold property, 
to vote and hold office. Social citizenship: 
«… refers to welfare state provisions – the supports that are designed to lessen 
the risks of sickness or disability, old age, unemployment, lack of income» 
(Handler 2004:9). 
Taylor-Gooby (2009:5) also includes the duty to finance «… the provision of benefits 
and services designed to meet social needs and enhance capabilities» as a part of social 
citizenship. Regarding the relationship between rights and duties Marshall considered 
the duty to pay taxes and insurance contributions as the most significant one. Other 
duties were more vaguely formulated and could be included in the general obligation 
(virtue) to live the life of a good citizen. However, the duty to work was of paramount 
importance. This did not only comprise the duty to have a job and hold it, but «..to put 
one’s heart into one’s job and work hard» (Marshall & Bottomore 1992:46). 
The idea of social citizenship has been criticized by several scholars in recent years. 
Social rights are regarded as promoting passivity and dependency among the poor 
caused by the absence of any obligation to participate in society (Kymlicka & Norman 
1994), the welfare state has been criticized for social paternalism, interventionism, the 
creation of new structures of dependency, moral decay and economic destructiveness 
(Habermas 1986; Eriksen 1988, Mead 1997 a, b). Cohen & Arato (1992) assert, for 
instance, that even if social rights intent to strengthen individual autonomy and 
reproduce social inclusion, they have the opposite effect. In opposition to Marshall the 
authors claim that social rights provide individuals advantages as clients rather than 
citizens and that they are strengthening the administrative state rather then individual 
autonomy. Bureaucratic administered social rights are creating new kinds of 
dependencies between the clients and the welfare professions/administration. 
Thus, Marshall’s theoretical/normative notion that social citizenship will enhance 
individual and collective autonomy, participation and social inclusion cannot be taken 
for granted – this is primarily an empirical question. We will, however, maintain the 
Marshallian conception of social citizenship as constituted by the construction of social 
rights. 
This paper will focus on how social citizenship is shaped within the context of the 
Norwegian welfare state. The core of social citizenship rights is fundamentally moral 
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and primarily worked out politically at the level of the nation state although supra-
national institutions such as the EU and the UN may impact on the national 
institutionalization of social rights. In the next section of the paper we will give a broad 
account of the legal and institutional construction of social citizenship following a 
juridifaction approach. 
Juridification and social citizenship 
Far-reaching processes of juridification are perceived to be at work in Norwegian 
society (and globally), with increasing legal regulation and authority shifting from 
political bodies to courts and other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, and with legal 
rights discourses playing a greater role in political mobilisation and decision-making in 
various social fields. Juridification processes comprise more detailed legal regulation, 
legal regulations of new areas, and conflicts and problems increasingly being framed as 
legal (cf Blichner & Molander 2008). Seen from the perspective of social rights, welfare 
policies contain one important field of juridification. Generally, the welfare state has 
implied a materialization of law (Habermas 1996; Teubner 1986) i.e. social law has 
become a significant political instrument for obtaining different social goals. In line with 
the idea of social citizenship people have acquired individual rights to welfare benefits 
and services such as old age benefit, unemployment benefit, disability benefit, education 
and some kinds of health services. On the other hand the legal development of the 
welfare state includes several areas where institutional obligations are more conspicuous 
than individual legal rights, such as social assistance, social care, health services and 
housing policy. 
Kjønstad and Syse (2005:97) link the concept of rights in welfare law to a distinction 
between legal claims on the one hand and competing for scarce resources on the other. 
Based on this distinction the authors develop a model for analyzing the existence of 
legal rights based on five questions. 1) Does the act itself state a right –obligation 
relationship? 2) Does the act use unambiguous and concise words and concepts or does 
it use general and vague formulations? 3) Can the administration or the courts in their 
decision making emphasize the financial situation of the debtor? 4) Are there any legal 
guarantees to secure that the citizen can attain his/her legal right. 5) Can the 
administrative decision be taken to court and are the competence of the court and the 
scope of judicial review extensive? From this model a legal social right in a strong sense 
implies that a citizen can make legal claim, that the act states a right – obligation 
relationship using concise concepts and formulations, that the financial situation of the 
debtor is irrelevant, that legal guarantees secure the attainment of the right and that the 
courts have far-reaching opportunities altering administrative decisions. This should 
mainly be regarded as an ideal-model of legal rights. Very few fields of welfare law fulfill 
the conditions of rights in a strong version (examples may be old-age pension and 
family allowance). On the other hand, welfare law that does not fulfill any dimension of 
the ideal model cannot be regarded as legal rights at all (but still be considered social 
rights in a general political sense). 
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In this paper juridification concerns the institutional construction of social citizenship 
by defining collective obligations and individual rights and duties. Social rights cannot, 
however, be discussed in isolation from other rights such as civil and political rights. 
Constructing social citizenship involves a relationship, and a possible tension, between 
the values of the welfare state, the rechtsstaat and the democratic state. As we have seen 
a main argument for social rights offered by T H Marshall was that they would enhance 
equal individual (civil) and public (political) autonomy among citizens, while other 
scholars have contested this argument. The Norwegian Power Report (Østerud m. fl 
2003:116) stated, for example, that increasing social rights entail a curtailment in the 
scope of democratic politics. 
As a result of the close connection between social citizenship and legal rights our 
approach emphasizes juridification as legal regulation and conflict solving. We perceive 
social citizenship as constituted in the relation between three institutional areas: politics, 
administration and law. 
Figure 1.The institutional construction of social citizenship 
 
 
      Political institutions 
 
 
     
 
 Legal institutions       Welfare administration 
        
 
    
           Citizens   
 
This figure takes Marshall’s three catalogs of rights and their institutional foundations as 
a starting point for analyses of citizenship. The construction of social citizenship 
potentially concerns the relationship between all these institutional areas. 
Administration, profession and welfare law 
As noted above the growth of the welfare state has resulted in a materialization, or 
instrumentalization, of public law. Kjønstad & Syse (2005) distinguish between several 
material areas of the welfare state: education, work and unemployment; social services 
and social assistance; health services, social insurances and pension. These fields of 
welfare law embrace a wide range of legal constructions concerning individual rights, 
political and institutional obligations, professional obligations etc. and they are directed 
towards the same or different institutional areas or groups. For example, the Norwegian 
Nav reform has involved an institutional integration of two governmental welfare 
agencies (the employment service and the insurance agency) and an institutional 
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partnership with the local social services, linking together several parts of welfare law 
(e.g. unemployment benefits, disability insurance, rehabilitation benefits and social 
assistance). Health law embraces services such as local somatic and psychiatric health 
services, somatic and psychiatric inpatient services and regulations of health 
professionals. Welfare law both constitutes and regulates the institutional fields of 
practice in the welfare state and is thus of great importance in the construction of social 
citizenship. 
Welfare policies are traditionally centred around the distribution of money, services 
and other benefits from public agencies to citizens (Kjønstad & Syse 2005). In a legal 
perspective formal decisions about giving or refusing to give different kinds of benefits 
are of crucial importance. Different legal constructions determine how such decisions 
are regulated, e.g. the scope of professional or municipal discretion. Historically, health 
services, educational services and social services have not ascribed any legal rights to 
citizens although rights have gradually become more important in these areas too. 
The modern welfare state is hallmarked by a fragmentation and de-hierarchicalisation 
of law in relation to different legal areas (e.g. social assistance, health, education) and 
administrative levels (e.g. state, counties, municipalities) (Nilssen 2007). An important 
aspect of this development is the connection between the expansion of the welfare state 
and the professionalization of public administration (Seip 1994; Terum 1996). Seip 
(1994:369) states that «The welfare state is in many ways its occupations». To attain the 
ambitious goals on care and treatment depended on growth in old occupations and the 
development of new ones. From the literature on professions we know that different 
occupational groups have search for control of certain lines of work in relation to other 
occupational groups – for instance, in the shape of what Abbott (1988) calls 
‘jurisdiction’ or Johnson (1972) calls ‘self-regulation’. Hence, the welfare state forms a 
strong potential foundation for administrative and professional power. This may oppose 
the idea of social citizenship because it may imply other kinds of interventions than 
those based on social rights, for instance paternalism (Stang Dahl 1994; Nilssen 2005, 
2007). The legal construction of the welfare state may enhance or confine the 
administrative and professional scope of discretion. Definitions of rights in a strong 
sense logically strengthen the citizen’s legal position against the welfare state and 
simultaneously limit the administrative/professional space of action. However, the 
implementation of social rights in many areas of the welfare state is dependent on 
professional discretion and cannot be regulated in accordance with the model of strong 
rights, for instance in medical treatment or in education. In many fields of social policy 
professional discretion may be a an important premise for the well being of many 
citizens and, in opposition to formal legal rights, contribute to enhance the accuracy of 
the distribution of welfare services (Rothstein 1994), 
Although we have argued that welfare law increasingly can be characterized by 
individual rights, legislation within this area also has the characteristics of general and 
broad object clauses that determine what societal objectives are to be protected in the 
different areas of society. In the Norwegian Social Services Act Section 1–1, for 
instance, the legislator opens for general societal and political discourses in the way they 
are formulated within politics and within the different sectors (Sand 1995). On one 
hand, this means that the application of the law will be based on references to general 
WORKING PAPER  7  –  2011 WELFARE  LAW AND THE  CONSTRUCTION OF  SOCIAL  C IT IZENSHIP  
12 
evaluations and standards within each area. This opens for politicization of the 
application of the law in the public administration as the government, as a political 
authority, can give continuous instructions or political signals (Sand 1995). On the other 
hand, politicians, by using such forms of legislation, have limited their legislative 
activities to the determination of broad objectives and procedural decisions. At the same 
time, they have often abdicated with regards to how these objectives are to be 
understood and implemented in practice. If individual rights are formulated in a general 
and abstract manner it gives space for discretion and this could result in a range of 
different interpretations of such rights and might cause variations in the practice of 
rights. The scope of discretion is, however, often curtailed by regulations and circulars 
formulated by administrative bodies. 
It is also important to note that social law itself may reflect professional power. For 
instance, Stang Dahl (1994) states that professions in the welfares state have played a 
considerable role in the development of social law and what she terms ‘the self 
producing social policy’ (op.cti:320). The handling of social problems, including the 
preparation of social law, is often left to professionals or experts. Hence, social law may 
itself be based on professional paternalism built on an alleged commonality of interests 
between the distributor and the recipient of social policy which largely promotes the 
cause of the professionals. On the other hand professions may serve as advocates for 
the interest of their client groups in the formulation of public policy (Jacobsen 1965). 
Analyzes of juridifaction/de-juridifaction processes have to take into account the 
relationship between the development of welfare law in specific legal areas and the 
construction of social citizenship. The strength of social citizenship is certainly affected 
by the existence of legal rights, but there is not a one-to-one relationship between strong 
rights and social inclusion and participation. Welfare areas not covered by strong legal 
rights (for instance parts of the social services) may constitute very important conditions 
for social integration and participation for some people. Nevertheless, citizenship is 
closely attached to the concepts of ‘autonomy’ and ‘participation’ implying that paternal 
relationships with no individual rights can be seen as contradictory to citizenship both in 
a social and civil sense. 
Our main point in this section is, however, that alterations in legal rights may affect 
the power relation between citizen and administration/professions and thus the 
construction of social citizenship. It is important to study the empirical implications of 
such processes in different legal areas. 
Law and politics 
In a democracy social citizenship is about the integrity, agency and influence of the 
individual citizen (Pettersson 2003). The ideal of democracy is realized to the extent that 
the citizens themselves are capable of executing power over their own and the society’s 
future (Olsen 1990, SOU 1990) and developed countries depend on active and capable 
citizens. This capacity depends on individual identities, recourses and the social 
circumstances, for instance the extent and quality of formal education (Marshall 
1950/2000; Locke 1996). Our main question is how and whether the use of legal 
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instruments and bodies in addressing social challenges equips individuals with the 
necessary recourses to act politically and thus strengthen the autonomy of the citizens. 
The construction of social citizenship implies that the political system takes 
responsibility for solving problems that arise in society. Legal instruments and bodies 
are now in use within areas not juridified before, such as education and health 
(Magnussen and Banasiak forthcoming). This development is followed by an extensive 
creation of new social rights within these areas. The extent of such juridification 
processes and their consequences for democracy are controversial issues and  the 
Norwegian debate echoes international concerns about juridification and the proper use 
of legal instruments and bodies in addressing social challenges (Hirschl 2004). 
Reallocation of power, for example through rights and rules, has influenced on 
political decision-making on the societal level and on individuals’ possibilities for and 
motivation to participate in both individual and collective action. Individual rights may 
increase individuals’ capacity to make autonomous decisions with minimal interference 
from public authorities. As such juridification may equip individuals with tools to act 
collectively, thus enlarging their autonomous space for decision-making. At the 
collective level, juridification will strengthen democratic politics if it stimulates citizen 
involvement in initiating and implementing policy (such as by community action 
programmes) and the clients’ participation in shaping health and social policy 
(Magnussen and Banasiak forthcoming). One example would be if citizens were granted 
participation rights in ‘reproduction councils’ to oversee and advise on troublesome 
issues for hospitals such as genetic testing and abortion (Hernes 1987). To the degree 
that rules and rights are formulated clearly they may protect vulnerable groups in society 
(Bernt 2003). 
Individual rights may contribute to increased public attention towards the 
subordinate position of weak groups in society. For example, health and social services 
can be understood as fundamental resources necessary for individuals to make 
autonomous, favourable, and conscious choices, that is, to make use of their civil and 
participation rights (Lundeberg 2005). In this context, rights may ease patients’ access to 
information about different opportunities to act and the procedural requirements that 
accompany each of the choices, thus increasing the predictability of the consequences of 
a given choice. Increasing the number of solutions might strengthen the power of 
individuals to hold authorities accountable, and might increase their sense of self-respect 
and integrity. Rights also constitute a legal safeguard for individuals. Legal activism—
formulating individual and group interests as legal claims can therefore have an 
important function in a democratic society (Lundeberg 2008). It subjects private and 
public exercise of power to judicial controls (Lundeberg 2005), and counteracts arbitrary 
and deficient administration practices that can emerge within closed professional 
cultures. Violation of rights can be a basis for official complaints, and rights that are not 
fulfilled can be enforced through judicial lawsuits. Individual rights may both grant the 
resources to act collectively and improve the self-image of weak and fragile individuals 
(Lundeberg 2005), for example, those who have been exposed to coercive procedures. 
To take advantage of the possibilities offered by legal rights, resources such as money 
and time are often required. The establishment and expansion of individual rights might 
create a number of opportunities and expand the sphere of individual action, but only 
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for those individuals who are already equipped with the resources needed to apply 
individual rights-based strategies (Andenæs 2006, Kjønstad 2004, Lundeberg 2008). 
An increase in the juridification of politics implies that the space for collective action 
becomes narrower. At the collective level, democratic politics is about participation in 
decisions with the aim of achieving collective purpose and meaning. The tendency to 
open up more areas to regulation by rights might gradually reduce the space in which 
politics is practiced by collective bodies. As a consequence, the individual’s motivation 
to participate in collective actions may suffer. We can observe an increase in individual 
rights, especially in the health care sector, in Norway during the past 20 years (Bernt 
1997). This increase in the number of individual rights might lead to shrinking of the 
space for practicing politics in the sense of collective action. This is because increases in 
individual rights over time will reduce the spaces in which collective institutions can 
conduct politics. One example would be patients increasingly seeking individual 
problem-solving strategies to influence their situation (Lundeberg 2005), instead of 
being motivated to involve themselves in patients’ interest groups (Janoski 1998), or to 
participate in hospital councils where collective decision-making processes take place. 
The political citizenship may be weakened since the individual is encouraged to behave 
as right owner, customer or client (Fimreite and Tranvik 2005). Individual social rights 
can also affect autonomy of local governments, making the court-room an important 
political arena. This indicates a shift away from traditional representative institutions and 
collective shaping of political opinions (Fimreite and Lægreid 2005). 
According to Marshall councils of local government constitute an important 
institutional foundation of political rights. Simultaneously municipalities are critical in 
the implementation of national welfare services. The Norwegian Power Report 
emphasized a possible contrast between juridification of social rights on the one hand 
and local democracy on the other. Generally, the argument is that strong legal rights to 
different welfare services (education, patient rights, right to social benefits, health 
services etc) transform welfare provisions into legal claims and reduces the influence of 
politicians in the shaping of welfare services at the local level. According to the Power 
Report the combination of juridification as individual rights, legal obligations and 
limited economic recourses at the local level, results in a reduction in the scope of action 
for local government (Østerud mfl 2003). This is interpreted as the main reason behind 
what is called «the crisis of local democracy» (NOU 2003:19, 28). 
One of the conclusions in the Norwegian Power Report was that the increase in 
social rights increases the power of courts and other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies at 
the sacrifice of political and administrative institutions (Østerud mfl 2003:116). If 
institutions such as the courts of justice or the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision 
acquire responsibility for the content and quality of health services - an activity 
previously reserved for the political arena (Fimreite 2001), this could result in a situation 
where majority-based bodies no longer decide health rights, for example (Magnussen 
and Banasiak fothcoming). When political problems are solved by institutions as the 
courts, the decision making takes place without participation from the citizens. In 
addition the Norwegian courts appear to be increasingly basing their rulings on 
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«equitable considerations»3 .This involves the making of decisions by reference not only 
to predefined rules—as expressed in structures or pre-existing legal practice—but also 
to policy considerations such as utility and fairness. Judicial decisions made with 
reference to political considerations imply that the courts are arrogating a role that 
democratic theory reserves for legislators (Eriksen and Terum 2000). These questions 
relate to the more fundamental relationship between law and politics. From a 
democratic point of view, it is crucial that this kind of judicial practice be subject to 
open and free debate. 
Analyzes of juridifaction/de-juridifaction processes have to take into account the 
relationship between law and politics and especially how and whether the use of legal 
instruments and bodies in addressing social challenges equips individuals with the 
necessary recourses to act politically and thus strengthen the autonomy of the citizens. 
It is necessary to study the empirical implications of such processes in different legal 
areas. As stated earlier the strength of social citizenship is certainly affected by the 
existence of legal rights, but there is not a one-to-one relationship between strong rights 
and social inclusion and participation. Our main point in this section is, however, that 
alterations in legal rights may affect the relationship between law and politics and thus 
the relation between political rights and social rights. Therefore social rights cannot be 
discussed in isolation from other rights such as civil and political rights. As such, 
political rights have the exceptional position of securing the autonomy and facilitating 
the access of citizens. For citizens, political rights imply their right to draw up the limits 
for how society is to be governed. On the other hand, a development characterized by a 
comprehensive juridification of politics may threaten these kinds of rights. An extensive 
juridification of politics may imply, for example, that the courts decide the context of 
social rights to a greater degree. If politics is formulated by institutions that are not 
under democratic control, we face the question of what to do if society develops in an 
unwanted direction. 
So far we have analyzed the construction of social citizenship from the intersection 
point between political, administrative and legal institutions. We have argued that 
welfare law is differently worked out in different areas when it comes to definitions of 
individual rights and duties, institutional competences, procedural rules, court 
competencies, scope of judicial review etc. In the two next sections we therefore will 
focus more specifically on the construction of welfare law by presenting recent 
development in legal regulation within two specific fields of welfare policy; work and 
health 
Legal development in the field of welfare and work 
From the early 1990s the «work line» has been of increasingly importance in Norwegian 
welfare policy. Globalization, intensified economic competition and demographic 
                                                 
3 The term «equitable consideration» is a translation of the Norwegian concept «reelle hensyn» and refers to 
assessments of what is fair and appropriate. 
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development (ageing societies) has lead to a reinforced focus on the relationship 
between labour market policy and social policy in Norway as in many other European 
and western countries (Ervik, Kildal & Nilssen 2009). Consequently, the institutional 
and legal construction of social citizenship has changed during the last 10–15 years. In 
this section we will concentrate on the most recent development in Norwegian welfare 
policy and the increasing influence of what have been termed ‘welfare contractualism’ 
(Nilssen & Kildal 2009). Contractualism both concerns how certain kinds of welfare 
policies are justified and the construction of socio-legal measures regulating the 
relationship between welfare agencies and clients. 
The idea of a welfare contract as a justifying principle was promoted in the 2006 
White Paper on Work, Welfare and Inclusion (St.meld.nr.9 2006–2007). A welfare 
contract refers to «..a mutual contracting process» that takes place before the 
administration makes its decisions, «between as equal partners as possible» (op.cit:16, 
167). The concept is used as a common and systematic principle in order to concretize 
mutual expectations, demands and obligations between the welfare administration and 
the recipients (Nilssen & Kildal 2009). It is not used in a legal sense but as a pedagogical 
tool in order to underline the connection that exists between individual rights and duties 
(St.meld.nr.9 2006–2007:15–17). This sharpened focus on rights and duties, implying 
«no rights without responsibilities», is primarily expressed in a closer attachment 
between the right to different welfare benefits and the duty to participate in the labour 
market. The idea of stringing together social policy and labour market policy is 
conspicuous in the Norwegian welfare administration reform (the Nav reform). The 
integration of the governmental labour market agency, social insurance agency and parts 
of the municipal social assistance services at the local level (Nav offices) was based on 
objectives such as employment orientation, user orientation and efficiency. People on 
different kinds of social benefits should be helped into the labour market by 
individualized and tailor- made services. Participation in the labour market was also 
considered as the main instrument in the governmental action plans against poverty. 
Several legal changes mirror this development. In our view two socio-legal measures, 
based on contractual thinking, are of particular interest: the Qualification Programme 
(QP) and the Employment Clarification Benefit (ECB). 
The QP was originally worked out as a basic action in the governmental fight against 
poverty. It was endorsed by the Parliament on October 19, 2007, and incorporated into 
the Social Service Act Chapter 5A (from 1.1.2010 into the new Social Assistance Act in 
the Employment and Welfare Administration (NAV) chapter 4). The QP is directed 
towards people of working age with substantially reduced working capacity, and who 
receive no or very limited contributions from social insurance schemes or from benefits 
anchored in the labour market. They should be, or at least be in danger of becoming, in 
a state of income poverty (mainly long-term social assistance receivers) (Nilssen & 
Kildal 2009). 
The law regulates some aspects of the content of the QP, i.e. it defines some 
activities which are mandatory and gives some examples of optional measures. The 
programme has to contain employment-directed measures and activities, and may 
include other efforts towards supporting and preparing the transition from 
unemployment to work (Chapter 4 §30). Participation in the QP is at the outset 
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voluntary and the participants are free to end the programme whenever they want to. 
However, potential participants within the target group are initially not allowed to 
choose social assistance as a form of subsistence instead of the QP. Financial social 
security is considered a subsidiary contribution and a person who refuses to apply for a 
QP, despite the local services advice of such a programme, may have his/her social 
security benefit reduced (Ot.prp.nr.70 2006–2007:31). Assessing an application for 
social assistance, the municipality may refer to the QP and the qualification benefit as 
the main source of subsistence. The qualification benefit4 will be disbursed to the 
participants as long as they take part in the programme. 
As a result of the Nav-refom objective of narrowing the gap between social policy 
and labor market policy, different kinds of material social benefits were more directly 
linked to work related services5. As a part of this process three of the traditional benefits 
– medical rehabilitation benefit, vocational rehabilitation benefit and temporary 
disability benefit - founded on the Social Security Act, were legally unified in one 
common measure: the Employment Clarification Benefit (ECB). The main objective of 
the ECB is to arrange for more people to take part in the labor market or work related 
activities. Compared with the temporary disability benefit more demands are made on 
recipients to participate in different kinds of activities. The intention of the law is 
explicitly expressed as to clarify which rights and duties the beneficiaries possess against 
the Welfare State (Ot.prp.nr.4 2008–2009). Each person’s entitlement to ECB is to be 
assessed by the Nav-office on the basis of his/her need of support to enter the labor 
market or work directed activities. If this benefit is granted, the recipient has a right to 
an activity plan worked out on the grounds of his/her individual needs. The assessment 
of needs is to be accomplished by using a standardized evaluation method of individual 
needs and ability to work. Everyone has a right to this kind of systematic examination of 
their needs of assistance to obtain work or work related activities. 
These rights are closely attached to some duties. The recipient has an obligation to 
participate in the preparation and following up of the activity plan. Continuous 
observation points are to be contracted between the parties in order to ensure that «the 
total amount of resources are used in the best possible way in relation to the objective 
of the ECB and to underline the obligations of Nav to follow up, and the receivers to 
take part in activities, which again will arrange for increasing transitions into the labor 
market» (ibid.:12). 
The recipients have to send standardized own-reports to the Nav-office in order to 
make it easier for the welfare administration to identify those who need to be followed 
up beyond the contracted observation points. These reports shall ensure regular contact 
between recipients and Nav in phases where it is not considered important with 
frequent direct encounters between the parties. Violation of the duty of activity may be 
financially sanctioned. 
                                                 
4 The qualification benefit consists of a given amount based on the basic sum (G) defined in the Social Insurance Act: 
2G for people aged 25 or more and 2/3 of 2G for people under 25 (reduced if the participant has other work 
income). 01.05.2010 1G= NOK 75 641. 
5 The description of the ECB is derived from Kildal & Nilssen (2011). 
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In our view these new social-legal measures manifest a certain alteration in the 
construction of social citizenship. In what we may term a traditional model of rights the 
relationship between individual rights and collective obligations are weighted on the 
political level and institutionalized through clear legal statutes. The content of rights is 
established through social law. This is not the kind of juridification that has taken place 
in the field of work and welfare. Contractualism implies a more open and direct 
coupling between rights and duties, i.e. rights are attached to certain behavioral 
conditions. The main idea is that the content of different kinds of quasi-contracts (it is 
not legally binding contracts), such as the QP and the ECB, are worked out between the 
involved parties (e.g. the receiver and the social worker) locally. A person may have a 
right to a QP or a ECB but no right to any services included in the contract (plan, 
programme) if it is not specified in any other law (weak legal guarantees and a very 
restricted court competence and scope of judicial review). If a person signs this quasi-
contract he/she is imposed certain duties and if these duties are not fulfilled he/she may 
be financially sanctioned. The contractual relationship is based on an individualistic and 
tailor-made relationship between rights and behavioural duties and is supposed to 
increase the client’s influence on service delivery (cf Yeatman 1998). However, the 
contractual relationship is based on asymmetric power relations and can be seen as 
instruments for controlling client behavior in order to create an «active citizen» (Nilssen 
& Kildal 2009). Hence, this idea of active citizenship differs clearly form the Marshallian 
understanding of citizenship based on freedom and participation as a member of a 
political community (status). The contractual approach reduces to a large extent social 
citizenship to «economic citizenship» i.e. an autonomous citizen becomes synonymous 
with an economic active citizen (participation in the labour market). Individualization 
and a strong connection between benefits and services at the local level may increase 
professional/administrative discretion and paternalism and thus imply a kind of 
juridification (or maybe de-juridification) which weakens rather than strengthen citizen’s 
social rights. 
Legal development in the health sector  
Legally enforceable rights for Norwegian patients have not been a significant part of the 
culture of the welfare state in Norway. Traditionally the public health service has been 
based upon a model of treatment where doctors and other health workers had authority 
to decide both about the form and distribution of health services, while citizens had few 
individual rights towards the public health service (Kjønstad 2004). Regulations within 
medicine were to a large degree formulated as abstract rules and did not dictate practice 
directly. This created a significant space for professional action and discretion (Berg 
1991:170). Questions regarding access to health care services have been governed by 
health personnel based on their specialist knowledge, ethical premises and personal 
judgments. The assumption was that patients were sufficiently protected by the duties 
and role prescriptions that were imposed on health care personnel and units. In this 
section we will concentrate on a significant change that has taken place during the last 
fifteen to twenty year as the health sector has been exposed to a comprehensive legal 
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regulation. This includes regulation of health services, organ transplantation, contagious 
diseases, «bio-banks», artificial reproduction, prenatal diagnostics, ethical requirements 
on medical research etc. (Sand 2005a). New legal regulations comprise both the health 
service institutions, the workers and the patients. From the beginning of the 1970’s and 
during the 1980’s, however, there has been a vast expansion of patients’ rights. It is 
especially this development that we pay attention to in this section. The topic of patient 
rights legislation has been under discussion in all Nordic countries during the last 
decade and from a European perspective, the Nordic countries have been particular 
active in the development of such rights (Winblad and Ringård 2009). 
International human rights conventions introduced in Europe during the years after 
the Second World War classified the right to health service a human right (Kjønstad 
1999). The debate about patient rights in Norway began in the 1980s and early 1990s 
and was related to the problems of waiting lists for elective treatment (Martinussen and 
Magnussen 2009). The development has primarily taken place through case law and 
culminated in the introduction of The Patients' Rights Act in 1999. The Patients’ Rights 
Law was a part of a more comprehensive legislative change in the health sector. The 
following legislative acts, that changed the position of Norwegian patients and a 
structure of health care services offered, were adopted in 1999: The Patients' Rights Act, 
Specialized Health Services Act, The Hospital Enterprise Act, Psychiatry and Mental 
Health Act and The Health Personnel Act. Although the focus of this work is on the 
Patients’ Rights Act and the way it is practiced within psychiatry field it has to be kept in 
mind that all of the above-mentioned acts are reflecting and complementing each other 
(St.meld nr. 23 (1996–97):11). 
When the Patient Right Act was adopted it covered a broad package of rights. The 
Act was partly a simplification and consolidation of already existing legislation and 
partly an implementation of new rights. The objective of the Act was to give the 
population equal access to high quality health care by granting patients rights in their 
relations with the health service and aimed at promoting health and welfare politics 
based on respect for human dignity, fair distribution of rights and duties and equal 
access to health care services (St. meld. nr. 25 (1996–97), Ot.prp.nr12 1999:1). Patient 
autonomy and participation in Norway have also been given legislative attention. The 
expansion of rights within the sector also encompasses new claims to certain services. 
Through this legislation patients are granted procedural rights and an increased 
opportunity to decide on questions concerning medical examination and treatment (Syse 
2004). Strengthening the rights of patients generally refers to patients being allowed a 
greater say in logistical matters (selecting physicians and hospitals) and in clinical matters 
(such as particitpation in elective medical decision making) as well as participation in 
local policy making (Saltman and Figueras 1997). The Act includes the right to choose 
hospital; evaluation within 30 days; reevaluation; participation and information; access 
to medical records; and special rights relating to children, complaints and to assistance 
from the Patients Ombudsmann (Vrangbæk et.al 2007). In 2003 and 2004 several 
amendments to the Patient Right Act were made. First child and youth psychiatric care 
was included in the scheme. Second, free choice of hospitals was also extended to 
include private hospitals that had entered into agreements with the regional health 
authorities. Third a time limit should be determined in line with sound medical practice 
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within which the necessary treatment must be provided. Fourth, the patient was given 
the right to be transferred to a private or foreign health care provider if the responsible 
regional health authorities failed to provide treatment within the time limit, and the right 
to treatment abroad if adequately treatment could not be provided in Norwy (Vrangbæk 
et.al 2007). The Norwegian Patient Act is by its length and contents the most 
comprehensive patient rights act among the four Nordic countries (Winblad and 
Ringard 2009). The following rights are included in the patients’ rights law: 
- the right to necessary treatment and care. 
- the right to an evaluation of the need for treatment within a maximum of 30 
days. 
- the right to an individual plan for treatment and care. 
- the right to a second opinion. 
- the right to choose where to receive treatment. 
- the right to be heard, give consent to and to receive necessary information on 
treatment. 
- the right to see the medical journal. 
- an independent patients’ ombudsman in all counties. 
Kjønstad has catoegorizess patient rights in three broad categories of rules: 1) those 
regulating the right to become a patient, 2) those regulating the rights patients have 
when they have attained the status of patients and 3 those providing patients with 
procedural rights. 
Norwegian citizens also have many explicit rights when accepted as patients. These 
rights are based on the principle of patient autonomy (Kjønstad 2007). 
If a Norwegian patient feels that any of his or her rights as a patient have been 
violated the patient may submit a complaint to an administrative body, the Chief County 
Medical Officer. The Chief County Medical Officer has a supervisory function with the 
purpose of withdrawing any decision by health care institutions that is not in accordance 
with the Patient Rights Act (MacKenney and Fallberg 2004). The decisions made by the 
county medical officer can be appealed to the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision. 
The Chief County Medical Officer`s decision is also admissible in civil court, which can 
compel hospitals and physicians to comply with patient rights law (Molven 2002, 
MacKenney and Fallberg 2004). According to the Patients` Rights Act, every Norwegian 
county must also have a patient`s ombudsman whose purpose is to safeguard patients’ 
legal rights and interests in relation to specialist health care services. The ombudsman 
can, to a reasonable extent, provide information to anyone who requests it (Johnsen 
2006). In Denmark and Norway patients have the formal possibility of appealing to a 
judicial court when their patient rights have been violated but only a small number of 
cases have reached the judicial system. 
Though the individual rights of patients are anchored in the welfare law and the level 
of ambitions is high they are not without reservations. For example the right to 
specialized health care is limited by the capacity of the relevant institutions (Feiring 2002 
et.al). Patients have a range of collective and individual ways of influencing health care 
services, but there is little evidence about the extent to which patients make use of these 
opportunities and their relative impact on system performance (Winblad and Ringård 
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2009). An important question is if there is a tension between increasing patient choice 
and more collective forms of patient and citizen involvement. In particular the question 
of whether promotion of individual «patient choice» is the best way to ensure 
responsiveness and flexibility in services because it potentially undermines the argument 
for user involvement a more egalitarian mechanism for securing these outcomes 
(Andersson et.al. 2007:109). Most likely patients of tomorrow will express greater 
demands for involvement in health care decision-making. They will want to take part in 
decisions concerning their treatments and the planning of their care and will also have 
higher expectations for the responsiveness of the system. Yet it is also likely that there 
will be significant differences in the exercise of these rights depending on 
socioeconomic status, education level an diagnosis. The increasing demands for 
responsiveness represent an important challenge for all Nordic countries as well as for 
other European countries. On the other hand this development may create new 
opportunities for practicing an active citizenship when health care services are 
developed. 
In any case health policy is a complicated area where the professional also in the 
future will have great influence over the development irrespective of individual rights or 
not (Christensen 2004:19) Concerns that individual patient rights will make the 
relationship between patients and providers more bureaucratic have been expressed by 
health care professionals on several occasions (Molven 2002), and according to 
Kjønstad the later development in health reforms are more reserved when it comes to 
the defining the individual rights more precisely and that the medical profession still 
holds a strong power position and limits the local democracy more than the individual 
rights (Kjønstad 2007). On the other hand the patients’ rights can have a democratizing 
effect exactly by contributing to reduce the power of the professionals. 
Final remarks 
From a Marshallian starting point we have emphasized that the relationship between 
citizenship and different kinds of legal rights constitutes the scope of individual 
freedom, public autonomy and the socio-economic prerequisites for participation and 
inclusion in society. The concept of «social citizenship» is closely attached to the 
development of modern welfare states but has to be perceived in relation to other 
catalogs of rights anchored in democracy and the rechtsstaat (political and civil rights). 
Our primary concern in this paper has been to elaborate on the legal construction of 
social citizenship within a Norwegian context and to outline some possible tensions 
between different considerations and values for further theoretical and empirical 
investigation. 
Social citizenship is on a general level constructed politically by assessment of the 
collective ethical obligations of a certain political community towards its citizens 
(O’Neill 1996). However, in practice social citizenship is determined by the way such 
obligations are institutionalized. Highlighting rights as fundamental in the constitution 
of social citizenship, welfare law becomes a central focus point and the conception of 
juridification processes has formed an important analytical framework. The construction 
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of social citizenship has been analyzed from the intersecting point between political, 
administrative and legal institutions. One important question is how different 
constructions of welfare law affect the relationship between such institutions and the 
citizens. 
Several possible outcomes are discussed in the paper. For instance, social law may 
strengthen the position of the client in relation with welfare professionals, but also lead 
to bureaucratic subordination. Strong legal rights may strengthen citizens’ ability to 
participate in society and at the same time weaken the foundation of political citizenship 
by narrowing the scope of political action (both nationally and locally). Individual rights 
may increase individuals’ capacity to make autonomous decisions and equip individuals 
with tools to act collectively, thus enlarging their autonomous space for decision-
making. On the other hand this might lead to a situation where political decisions 
become permanent and thus weaken possibilities to execute participation rights and the 
individual’s motivation to participate in collective actions may suffer. Individual rights 
may contribute to increased public attention towards the subordinate position of weak 
groups in society and to the degree that rules and rights are formulated clearly, they may 
protect vulnerable groups in society. On the other hand, to take advantage of the 
possibilities offered by legal rights, resources such as money and time are often required 
implying that the opportunities following the expansion of individual action may be 
reserved for those who are already equipped with sufficient resources. If individual 
rights are formulated in a general and abstract manner, it gives space for discretion 
which may result in a range of different interpretations of such rights, thus causing 
variations in the practice of rights. Welfare law which opens up for local political or 
professional discretion may increase the scope of paternal interventions and contradict 
the idea of both civil and social rights. Specified rules and rights may, on the other hand, 
contribute to increased trust between users and service providers by limiting the risk of 
differences in distribution of services. Juridification of social policy may increase the 
power of the courts at the expense of democratic institutions. On the other hand legal 
activism -formulating individual and group interests as legal claims - can have an 
important function in a democratic society as violation of rights can be a basis for 
official complaints, and rights that are not fulfilled can be enforced through judicial 
lawsuits. 
Welfare law is very differently worked out concerning definitions of individual rights 
and duties, institutional obligations and competences, procedural rules, court 
competencies, scope of judicial review etc. Hence, it is important to study juridification 
processes on distinct areas of the welfare state. As shown by our two examples the 
development can be quite different in fields like health and social service. 
In the field of health services it seems reasonable to say that a juridification process 
has taken place - implying a reinforcement of individual patients’ rights and thus a 
strengthening of social citizenship (maybe at the expense of a more bureaucratic service 
provision). The expansion of rights within the sector encompasses claims to certain 
services and through the legislation patients are granted procedural rights and an 
increased opportunity to decide on questions concerning medical examination and 
treatment. Though patients have a range of collective and individual ways of influencing 
health care services, there is little evidence about the extent to which patients make use 
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of these opportunities and their relative impact on system performance. As stated earlier 
an important question is if there is a tension between increasing patient choice and more 
collective forms of patient and citizen involvement. It is also likely that there will be 
differences in the exercise of the rights depending on citizens socioeconomic status, 
education level an diagnosis. 
In the field of social policy individual legal rights to social benefits have increasingly 
been comprehended as to render people passive, leading to a stronger coupling between 
individual rights and duties expressed through the establishment of quasi-contractual 
legal arrangements. 
As we have seen the freedom of contract constitutes a core element of the 
Marshallian catalogue of civil rights, particularly the citizens’ proprietary rights and the 
economic freedom of choice. Originally the realization of these basic civil rights was the 
responsibility of private law (constituting the ‘lawful contract’). This is very different 
from the traditional laws of the welfare state (substantial social law), which are oriented 
towards a top-down (political) steering based on substantial social objectives and 
interpretations of the citizens’ social rights. While contract law implies individualization, 
privatization, freedom of choice, mutuality and material de-legalization 
(proceduralization), the substantial public law of the welfare state implies political 
control, bureaucratization and material juridification. These apparently opposite features 
of private and public law are supposed to be reconciled when contract philosophy is 
introduced within the field of the welfare state. 
It may be argued that contractualism implies a material de-juridification in the way 
that it emphasizes tailor-made services and increased local discretion in the preparation 
of the content of welfare policies (weak legal control). This may also entail a 
development towards de-politicization of social provision although quasi-contracts can 
be understood as a new mode of controlling behavior which are closely attached to 
political objectives (e.g. to create an economic active citizen). In the long run, however, 
«…contractarian conceptions of citizenship may weaken the kind of social solidarity on 
which the Scandinavian welfare states are based» (Nilssen & Kildal 2009:319) and thus 
leads to a further move away from social citizenship in the Marshallian sense. 
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